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INTRODUCTION
Individuals with disabilities are an important part of our society,
and the federal government has recognized the valuable role that
they can play in the workforce. It is surprising, therefore, that the
National Labor Relations Board (the Board) and federal courts have
generally denied such individuals protections under the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) while these individuals seek to enhance
their workplace skills through rehabilitation. These protections
can be very important for employees’ well-being on the job, so the
Board’s disposition toward denying rehabilitative employees NLRA
rights should be closely examined. This Note demonstrates that
the current decision-making process for granting rehabilitative
employees NLRA protections is far too capricious and politically
influenced. Thus, this Note proposes a workable solution that
balances competing policy concerns in order to provide rehabilitative
employees and employers with greater access to their rights under
the NLRA. 
The NLRA protects employees who engage in loud, noticeable acts
like picketing, striking, and collective bargaining.1 Importantly,
however, it also protects small groups of employees who act together
for mutual aid and protection.2 For instance, the NLRA would
protect a small, unorganized handful of employees who spontane-
ously refuse to work because a factory is too cold.3 
In recent years, the Board and federal courts have classified sev-
eral groups of workers into categories that prohibit those workers
from receiving NLRA protections. Academics and politicians have
noticed many of these questionable exclusions. Nominal “independ-
ent contractors,” student research assistants, and charge nurses
with minimal supervisory authority have all received substantial
scholarly consideration, and Congress has attempted to amend the
NLRA to make sure that the Act covers these excluded groups.4
1. National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) §§ 7, 8(b)(4)(B), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(b)(4)(B)
(2006).
2. Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
3. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 13-14 (1962).
4. For information regarding the position of nominally independent contractors, see H.R.
915, 111th Cong. § 806 (2009) (granting express carriers independent contractor employee
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Although rehabilitative employees are also frequently excluded from
the benefits of the NLRA, they have not received the same atten-
tion.5
Rehabilitative employees are a unique set of employees whose
distinct needs require particular consideration. They often have
mental disabilities or physical deficiencies that impair their ability
to work in typical employment environments.6 The Board vividly
described some attributes of a group of rehabilitative employees in
Key Opportunities, Inc., showing how such employees may not be
able to work in a typical workplace.7 Several employees, for exam-
ple, had such low attention spans that their output was only 5
percent of what coworkers without disabilities could produce.8 Many
wandered away from their workstations, and some needed daily
instruction to remind them how to perform simple tasks like
mowing lawns.9 One employee cried out of jealousy whenever his
supervisor paid more attention to another coworker.10 Perhaps the
status under the NLRA); Todd D. Saveland, FedEx’s New “Employees”: Their Disgruntled
Independent Contractors, 36 TRANSP. L.J. 95 (2009). Research assistants have received similar
legislative and academic attention. See, e.g., Teaching and Research Assistant Collective
Bargaining Rights Act, H.R. 1461, 111th Cong. (2009) (proposing to amend the NLRA to
include teaching and research assistants as covered employees); Ryan Patrick Dunn,
Comment, Get a Real Job! The National Labor Relations Board Decides Graduate Student
Workers at Private Universities Are Not “Employees” Under the National Labor Relations Act,
40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 851 (2006). Professionals with limited supervisory authority have also
attracted notice. See, e.g., Re-Empowerment of Skilled and Professional Employees and
Construction Trades Workers (RESPECT) Act, H.R. 1644, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing to
amend the NLRA’s definition of “supervisor” to enable employees with limited supervisory
powers to be classified as “employees” rather than exempt supervisors); John Hensley &
Debra Burke, The Changing Nature of Supervision: Implications for Labor Management
Relations in the Twenty-First Century, 33 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 397 (2009).
5. The academic studies that have been done on rehabilitative employees, though helpful,
are now out of date due to changes in the Board’s analytical approach toward rehabilitative
employees. See infra Part III. For helpful background information, see generally Ellen R.
Anderson, Invisible Laborers: Sheltered Workshops Under the National Labor Relations Act,
3 LAW & INEQ. 265 (1985); Catherine A. Bean, Comment, Labor Law—The National Labor
Relations Board’s Jurisdictional Power over Handicapped Employees in Sheltered Workshops,
11 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 347 (1989).
6. See NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d 399, 401-02 (5th Cir. 1983)
(discussing blind rehabilitative employees); see also Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B.
1371, 1375 (1982) (describing some of the impairments rehabilitative employees possess). 
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biggest obstacle to integration in a typical workplace setting was
that some employees had a tendency to “throw things” at coworkers
and supervisors.11 Though this group of employees had especially
severe employment handicaps, the Board also includes individuals
with less severe employment barriers like a criminal record or lack
of education as rehabilitative employees in certain circumstances.12
Commenting on rehabilitative employees, the Fifth Circuit ob-
served, “Unfortunately, experience indicates that the private sector
is not very anxious to hire blind and multi-handicapped workers.”13
As a result, some employers, often nonprofits, have stepped in to
provide such individuals with a place to work and learn job skills.14
These employers cater to the needs of individuals with disabilities
by providing counseling, job training, reduced or no production
standards, minimal discipline, and job placement services.15 
To properly frame why excluding rehabilitative employees from
the NLRA’s protections may be a problem, an example from a
well-read labor law case is useful. Applying the facts of NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co. to rehabilitative employees illustrates
the impact that a lack of NLRA protections may have on the work
life of rehabilitative employees.16 In Washington Aluminum, seven
employees walked out of work shortly after the morning bell rang.17
The weather outside was unseasonably cold, with temperatures
ranging between 11 and 22 degrees Fahrenheit.18 Lacking insulation
and with several doors wide open, the factory quickly became
bitterly cold.19 The broken furnace failed to warm the plant.20 One
of the workers testified that he saw workers huddled together,
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 536-37 (1977) (labeling
employees referred by state agencies for vocational training and work experience as
“rehabilitative employees” alongside those with physical or mental disabilities).
13. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 653 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1981), rev’d
on reh’g, 696 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1983).
14. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 983-84 (2004).
15. Id. at 984.
16. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
17. Id. at 11.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 10.
20. Id. at 11.
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“shaking a little,” because of the cold.21 Finally, one said, “I am
going home, it is too damned cold to work!”22 Six others followed.23
Their employer summarily fired all seven men.24 The Board
decided that their action was protected concerted activity under
section 7 of the NLRA and ordered their reinstatement with
backpay.25 The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that employees
could walk out without a prior demand for changes in working
conditions, even if such an act undermined employee discipline and
did not allow for prior negotiations.26
Now change the facts, but only slightly. Seven employees with
disabilities—three of whom are blind, three of whom are severely
mentally handicapped, and one of whom is a vocational rehabili-
tation client—work at the same factory for an employer that offers
job training, counseling, reduced discipline, and a job placement
program. In the same conditions, under the current Board test,
each of them most likely could be terminated without recourse.27
Blind, mentally handicapped, and vocational rehabilitation clients
21. Id.
22. Id. (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 12.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 12-13.
26. Id. at 13-14.
27. Rehabilitative employees have received NLRA rights in the ultimate outcome of only
four of the fourteen reported cases. See Goodwill Indus. of N. Ga., 350 N.L.R.B. 32 (2007)
(granting NLRA rights); Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982 (2004) (denying
rights); Balt. Goodwill Indus., Inc., 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1015 (Apr. 30, 1996) (granting rights),
enforcement denied, 134 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 1998); Davis Mem’l Goodwill Indus., 318 N.L.R.B.
1044 (1995) (granting rights), enforcement denied, 108 F.3d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Goodwill
Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. 764 (1991) (denying rights); Goodwill Indus. of Tidewater, Inc.,
304 N.L.R.B. 767 (1991) (denying rights); Ark. Lighthouse for the Blind, 284 N.L.R.B. 1214
(1987) (granting rights), enforcement denied, 851 F.2d 180 (8th Cir. 1988); Key Opportunities,
Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371 (1982) (denying rights); Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 248
N.L.R.B. 1366 (1980) (granting rights), enforcement denied, 653 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1981), rev’d
on reh’g, 696 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1983); Cincinnati Ass’n for the Blind, 235 N.L.R.B. 1448 (1978)
(granting rights), enforced, 672 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1982); Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231
N.L.R.B. 536 (1977) (denying rights); Chi. Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249 (1976)
(granting rights after employer stipulated that rehabilitative employees could be covered by
the NLRA); Epi-Hab of Evansville, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 637 (1973) (denying rights); Sheltered
Workshops of San Diego, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 961 (1960) (denying rights). The Key
Opportunities case is included in this survey because the Board was required to determine
whether the rehabilitative employees were “employees,” even though it was their alleged
supervisors—not the workers themselves—who were seeking NLRA protections. 265 N.L.R.B.
at 1372.
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shivering in the cold without a remedy are an incredibly sympa-
thetic group. Do we really want the kind of labor law that would
grant section 7 rights to “normal” employees but deny them to this
group?
Perhaps even more shocking than this scene, the answer may be
yes. In order to reach that conclusion, one must consider the impor-
tant policy considerations on both sides of the issue. On the one
hand, there are strong federal policies promoting employment of
those with severe disabilities and extending NLRA protections to
this group may reduce employment opportunities for those with
disabilities.28 On the other hand, much of the work that these
employees do is identical to what an ordinary employee with NLRA
protections would perform.29 In addition, sham rehabilitation cen-
ters may suppress workplace rights without providing any real
benefit to the workers.30 Furthermore, at least on its face, distin-
guishing between employees on the basis of their disabilities and
the steps that they have taken to overcome their disabilities seems
to contravene the policies underlying the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act (ADA).31
For such a delicate balance, the Board currently uses a remark-
ably imprecise test to determine whether rehabilitative employees
should enjoy the benefits of the NLRA. After all of the appeals were
exhausted, rehabilitative employees received NLRA protections in
only four of the fourteen reported rehabilitative employee cases.32 At
each level of review, the reviewing body frequently reversed lower
determinations because of ambiguities in the current test.33 This
Note proposes a two-part solution that will reduce this confusion. It
strikes a policy balance in order to provide rehabilitative employers
and employees more certainty of their rights and responsibilities
under the NLRA.
First, this Note argues that the Board should adopt a rebuttable
presumption that the NLRA does not cover rehabilitative employees
for a short time after they are initially hired, unless an employee
28. See infra Part IV.B.
29. See infra note 198 and accompanying text.
30. See infra Part V.C.
31. See infra notes 180-87 and accompanying text.
32. See supra note 27.
33. See supra note 27. For a graphical representation, see infra Part III.D fig.1.
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can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer is not providing rehabilitative services. Second, this Note
argues that the Board should adopt a rebuttable presumption that
the NLRA does cover rehabilitative employees after the initial
rehabilitation period. An employer may rebut the presumption of
“employee” status through a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer is providing actual rehabilitation services on a regular
basis. 
These two rebuttable presumptions make the coverage decision
on rehabilitative employees more responsive to the underlying
policy concerns affecting rehabilitative employees. During the ini-
tial period, the person on the jobsite is more like a client than an
employee.34 The Board should give rehabilitative employers an
opportunity to help these individuals gain important workplace
skills without interference from unions or unfair labor practice
charges.35 Easy access to rehabilitative services reflects congressio-
nal efforts to extend jobs to those with disabilities who need special
training.36 The employer’s ability to rebut the second presumption
actually adds an incentive for the employer to ensure that the em-
ployees are continually receiving training and support. After the
initial period, however, and in the absence of ongoing rehabilitation,
the person working begins to become indistinguishable from a
true employee and deserves NLRA protections in order to prevent
exploitation.37
This Note begins in Part I by defining the term “rehabilitative
employee” and contrasting it to the term “employee with disabili-
ties.” Part II gives a brief background of the NLRA and the Board.
Part III examines the methods that the Board has used to exclude
rehabilitative employees from the NLRA’s protections. Part III uses
an example to demonstrate why the label “employee” is much more
than mere bureaucratic nomenclature, showing how the lack of
“employee” status caused a group of employees to lose their NLRA
rights. Part IV sets forth the first presumption—that rehabilitative
34. See Goodwill Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. 764, 765 (1991) (describing why certain
employees are more like clients than employees); see also infra Part IV.
35. See Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 988 (2004).
36. See infra Part IV.A.
37. See infra Parts V.A.2, V.B.
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employees are not entitled to NLRA protections for an initial
period—and then supports that presumption with several policy
arguments. Part V sets forth the second presumption—that reha-
bilitative employees are entitled to NLRA protections after the
initial employment period—and supports that presumption by
questioning the anticoverage position and advancing several pro-
coverage arguments. In conclusion, this Note shows that the current
Board has an excellent opportunity to implement these modifica-
tions and then urges it to do so.
I. DEFINING REHABILITATIVE EMPLOYEES
At the outset, it should be noted that the terms “rehabilitative
employee” and “employee with disabilities” are not synonymous. The
distinction is easily missed.38 The ADA defines “disability” as “a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
major life activities.”39 It further defines “qualified individual with
a disability” as one who can, “with or without reasonable accommo-
dation, ... perform the essential functions of the employment
position that such individual holds or desires.”40 Thus, by definition,
a qualified individual with a disability could work at a normal job
alongside ordinary employees performing all of the essential func-
tions of the job. The ADA grants strong confidentiality protections
to employees with disabilities,41 so an employee with a disability in
fact may be indistinguishable from ordinary employees in the eyes
of that worker’s peers. Indistinguishable or not, the NLRA would
protect such an employee working for an ordinary employer.42
In one noteworthy rehabilitative employee case, the employer
argued that certain employees with disabilities—such as hearing
38. See Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 989-96 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting)
(arguing passionately throughout the dissent that employees with disabilities should have
NLRA protections). 
39. Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990 § 3(2), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
40. Id. § 101(8), 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
41. See id. § 102(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d).
42. See, e.g., Conoco, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 819, 834 (1982) (holding that employees with
disabilities have NLRA protections and can exercise their section 7 right to refrain from
participating in a strike); see also Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 988 (majority opinion) (noting that
once rehabilitative employees leave the rehabilitative employer, they are free to enjoy the
protections of the NLRA).
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impairment, diabetes, high blood pressure, and high cholesterol—
should be excluded from the bargaining unit because they were
rehabilitative employees.43 The employer did not actively provide
any kind of special job training, counseling, or placement services.44
The Board rejected the employer’s argument because these alleged
rehabilitative employees, though perhaps “qualified individuals
with disabilities” under the ADA, were in fact just ordinary
employees entitled to all of the NLRA’s protections.45
The true distinction between rehabilitative employees and em-
ployees with disabilities is the relationship with the employer.46
If the employer is fulfilling its role as a rehabilitator, it will be
providing important services like counseling and training in an
atmosphere that is less rigorous than typical competitive work
environments.47 Additionally, the employer often receives funding
from grants or governmental programs and occasionally operates at
a significant loss in order to sustain the rehabilitative relationship.48
It is this special relationship, and not the employees’ disabilities,
that causes the Board to treat rehabilitative employees differently
than other workers.49
Even after understanding this distinction, however, the norma-
tive question remains: should the Board treat rehabilitative em-
ployees differently than ordinary employees? That question is best
resolved by looking first at the aims of the NLRA and the Board’s
function in enforcing it.
43. Goodwill Indus. of N. Ga., 350 N.L.R.B. 32, 34 (2007).
44. Id. at 34-35.
45. Id. at 32, 36.
46. Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 988 (“First, and most importantly, our position does not
exclude disabled people from the protections of the Act on the basis of their disabilities.... We
exclude these persons because of the nature of the relationship to the employer.”).
47. See, e.g., Goodwill Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. 764, 765 (1991) (exempting an
employer’s employees from the NLRA because the lack of discipline, the lack of production
standards, and the emphasis on rehabilitation were not typical of ordinary work
environments).
48. See Ark. Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 184 n.4 (8th Cir. 1988)
(noting that the employer lost $200,000 in one year due to its rehabilitation program); see also
Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1374 (1982) (observing that the employer’s losses
arising from its rehabilitation services indicated that the employer would be better off
financially without the rehabilitative employees).
49. Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 988.
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II. BRIEF BACKGROUND OF THE NLRA AND THE BOARD
Congress passed the NLRA to forestall obstructions to the free
flow of commerce that can arise due to inequalities in bargaining
power between employers and employees.50 The NLRA grants
employees the right to engage in certain concerted activities for
mutual aid and protection.51 The NLRA also protects them with job
security and backpay should their employer discharge them for
exercising these rights.52 Simultaneously, the NLRA grants em-
ployers protection from certain kinds of unfair labor practices
committed by organized labor, such as secondary boycotts of a third-
party business in order to coerce that business into recognizing a
union that the Board has not certified.53 In addition, the NLRA
protects the right of employers to discharge employees so long as
that discharge is not in retaliation for engaging in protected
activities.54 Congress hoped that giving employees and employers
these protections would enable both sides to have the power and
influence necessary to reach amicable agreements through collective
bargaining.55
Congress created the Board in order to have an agency that would
develop the special institutional knowledge and expertise necessary
to administer the NLRA.56 Congress granted the Board broad stat-
utory jurisdiction over private business organizations.57 The Board’s
statutory jurisdiction runs concurrently with the Commerce Clause
of the Constitution, reaching all activities that impact interstate
commerce.58 The NLRA originally gave the Board discretion to
50. NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2006).
51. Id. § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
52. Id. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
53. See id. § 8(b)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4).
54. See id. § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c).
55. See id. § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151.
56. S. COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, 74TH CONG., MEMORANDUM COMPARING S. 2926, 73D
CONG., AND S. 1958, 74TH CONG. (Comm. Print 1935) (noting that the Board would become an
entity with expertise in resolving labor disputes), reprinted in 1 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT, 1935, at 1362-63 (1949).
57. NLRA § 10, 29 U.S.C. § 160 (giving the Board the power to regulate all unfair labor
practices affecting commerce).
58. NLRB, AN OUTLINE OF LAW AND PROCEDURE IN REPRESENTATION CASES § 1-100 (2008)
[hereinafter RC MANUAL]; see also NLRA § 2(7), 29 U.S.C. § 152(7).
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pursue those labor cases that the Board considered to be the most
important for the national welfare, but an amendment to the NLRA
has considerably diminished this discretion.59 Now, the Board has
only limited discretion to decline jurisdiction over labor matters.60
In modern times, the Board still attempts to exercise discretion in
order to further its labor policy objectives.61 Due to the statutory
limitations, however, if the Board desires to exclude a certain class
of employees from NLRA protections for political or policy reasons,
it must creatively find ways to do so.62
III. EXCLUDING EMPLOYEES FROM NLRA COVERAGE
The Board has two primary courses of action if it decides that it
wants to exclude an individual from the NLRA’s protections. First,
the Board can attempt to decline jurisdiction over the employer,
although this method is difficult due to the Board’s limited jurisdic-
tional discretion.63 Second, the Board can decide that the person
working at the jobsite is not entitled to the NLRA’s protections
because the NLRA contains either a specific exception for that type
of worker or the person is not an employee at all.64 The Board has
used both the jurisdictional and definitional approaches in exclud-
ing rehabilitative employees from the NLRA’s protections.65
59. RC MANUAL, supra note 58, § 1-100.
60. When Congress passed the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRA)
of 1959, it sharply curtailed the Board’s jurisdictional discretion. Id. The Board must assert
jurisdiction if the business has either an inflow or outflow across state lines or a gross annual
volume of business above a certain level. Id. §§ 1-201 to -202.
61. Wilma B. Liebman, Values and Assumptions of the Bush NLRB: Trumping Workers’
Rights, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 643, 645-50 (2009) (describing methods that the Board uses to narrow
the NLRA’s application).
62. See id.
63. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
64. See Liebman, supra note 61, at 646.
65. Compare Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 538 (1977) (refusing to exercise
jurisdiction over rehabilitative employers), with Goodwill Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. 764,
765-66 (1991) (denying NLRA protections to rehabilitative employees because they are not
section 2(3) employees).
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A. Declining Jurisdiction over Certain Employers
In early rehabilitative employee cases, the Board attempted to
decline jurisdiction over rehabilitative employers in order to exclude
them from the NLRA’s protections.66 The Board looked at whether
the relationship between the employer and employee was typical of
a normal industrial relationship, or whether their interactions were
more appropriately considered rehabilitative.67 If the relationship
was rehabilitative, the Board assumed that the employers had good
purposes, so exerting jurisdiction over them would not further the
policy aims of the NLRA.68
In the landmark case St. Aloysius Home, the Board decided that
it could no longer decline jurisdiction over nonprofit charitable
employers simply as a result of the employer’s good intentions.69
Since that case, the Board must fully consider the employer’s effect
on commerce and may not decline jurisdiction on the basis of an
employer’s benevolent intentions alone.70 Applying St. Aloysius
Home, the Board has reasoned that though rehabilitative employers
may be nonprofits and may have good purposes, the Board may no
longer decline jurisdiction over them for these reasons alone. As a
result, the Board must now justify excluding rehabilitative employ-
ees from the Act’s coverage on other grounds.71
B. Deciding that Rehabilitative Workers Are Not “Employees”
Because the Board typically cannot decline jurisdiction over reha-
bilitative employers, the Board frequently decides that rehabilita-
tive employees are not actually “employees” within the meaning of
66. See, e.g., Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 961, 964 (1960).
67. See, e.g., Ark. Lighthouse for the Blind, 284 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1216 (1987); Sheltered
Workshops of San Diego, 126 N.L.R.B. at 964. This test became known as the “typically
industrial, primarily rehabilitative” test. See, e.g., infra note 75.
68. Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. at 538; Epi-Hab of Evansville, Inc., 205
N.L.R.B. 637, 637 (1973); Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, 126 N.L.R.B. at 964.
69. 224 N.L.R.B. 1344, 1344 (1976).
70. Id.; see, e.g., Goodwill Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. at 765 & n.7 (overruling
precedent to the extent that it declined jurisdiction due to the rehabilitative employer’s good
purposes and holding that rehabilitative employees are not entitled to NLRA protections
because they are not statutory “employees”).
71. Goodwill Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. at 765 & n.7.
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the NLRA.72 Section 2(3) of the NLRA defines “employee” as any
employee not exempted by an exception in the NLRA.73 Thus, if the
Board wants to deny coverage to a certain class of workers through
the section 2(3) definitional method, it may either define the person
on the jobsite as an individual categorically exempt from the NLRA,
such as a supervisor, or it may refuse to define the person as an
“employee.” In recent years, the Board has used both approaches to
deny NLRA coverage to charge nurses and graduate teaching
assistants.74
The Board frequently uses this definitional method to remove
NLRA protections from rehabilitative employees. After deciding in
St. Aloysius Home that declining jurisdiction over charitable em-
ployers was inappropriate, the Board continued to use the “typically
industrial, primarily rehabilitative” analysis in subsequent cases.75
Its purpose in using the test, however, changed.76 The test now
functioned to determine whether the rehabilitative workers were in
a traditional industrial relationship with the employer—and thus
by implication “employees” that Congress intended the NLRA to
cover.77
The Board considers several factors when determining whether
the employer-employee relationship is “typically industrial” or
“primarily rehabilitative.”78 It considers whether the employer
offers counseling, job training, or other life-skills classes, and
whether employees are forced to adhere to production standards.79
Additionally, the Board is heavily influenced by whether employees
with disabilities receive a different type of discipline than ordinary
employees.80 It tends to view the employees’ progress out of the
rehabilitation program via a job-placement service as an indicator
72. E.g., id. at 765 (deciding that the rehabilitative workers were not employees but
rather clients of the employer).
73. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2006) (exempting supervisors, independent con-
tractors, and others from coverage).
74. See supra note 4.
75. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 993 (2004) (Members Liebman and




79. Id. at 993 n.17.
80. Id.
2010]     REHABILITATIVE EMPLOYEES 621
that the relationship is rehabilitative.81 The Board believes that
these factors show that the employer-employee relationship is
unlike ordinary private sector employment situations, and thus not
subject to ordinary labor laws.82
C. Applying the Multifactor Test
The application of the multifactor “typically industrial, primarily
rehabilitative” test is best understood in the context of an actual
rehabilitative case. In Goodwill Industries of Denver, the Board
determined that a bargaining unit that would have included indi-
viduals with a variety of employment impediments was inappro-
priate.83 Goodwill provided employment, training, and placement
services for many of its employees.84 The company placed these
individuals at a nearby Air Force base, where they stocked mer-
chandise and performed janitorial duties.85 Goodwill took on three
classes of individuals: client/trainees with severe handicaps who
received active rehabilitation services, client/employees who had
disabilities but who were more capable than the client/trainees and
who were employed full-time by Goodwill, and full-time employees
without disabilities.86 
Goodwill had relaxed discipline policies for client/trainees and
client/employees, preferring to counsel or transfer them to another
worksite rather than discharge them.87 The employees without
disabilities, however, were subject to regular discipline and dis-
charge.88 The client/trainees and client/employees had no set pro-
duction requirement, but the employees without disabilities could
be discharged for failing to meet their daily quotas.89 Goodwill tried
to place the client/trainees with outside employers and would keep
open their position at Goodwill for thirty days if they did not succeed
81. Id.
82. See Goodwill Indus. of Tidewater, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 767, 768-69 (1991).
83. Goodwill Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. 764, 766 (1991).
84. Id. at 764.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 764, 766.
87. Id. at 764.
88. Id. at 766.
89. Id. at 764, 766.
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when placed.90 Goodwill also provided transportation for the
client/trainees and on going counseling and coordination with the
governmental agencies that referred these individuals to Goodwill
for work.91 The Board decided that the client/trainees were not in a
typical industrial relationship with the employer due to the services
the employer provided and thus denied NLRA rights to them.92
Objectively, these client/trainees seem to have been receiving active
rehabilitation.
At the other extreme, the employees without disabilities had none
of the benefits of reduced discipline, counseling, or job placement;
instead, they were held to rigid production standards.93 The Board
determined that these workers were section 2(3) employees entitled
to NLRA protections.94 As a result, the Board directed an election for
a unit of the employees without disabilities.95 If this election were
successful, the unit would be able to negotiate a collective bargain-
ing agreement with Goodwill and could possibly gain benefits such
as just cause termination, extended health benefits, and grievance
processing procedures. Because the client/trainees were excluded
from the unit, they would not share in any of these contractual
benefits.
Though the “typically industrial, primarily rehabilitative” clas-
sifications of full-time employees without disabilities and client/
trainees were rather straightforward, the appropriate classification
for the client/employees was much more difficult. Most of the client/
employees did not receive any counseling services.96 They were more
independent and did not need Goodwill to transport them to and
from work.97 The client/employees were also long-term employees of
Goodwill.98 On the other hand, they did not have to meet production
requirements, and Goodwill avoided discharge as a means of dis-
cipline.99 The Board, dominated by a Republican majority, decided
90. Id. at 764-65.
91. Id. at 765.
92. Id.




97. Id. at 765.
98. Id. at 766.
99. Id.
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that these last two factors tipped the balance toward treating the
client/employees as rehabilitative employees, so they lost all NLRA
rights and collective bargaining benefits.100 This conclusion is easily
challenged, and one can imagine how a Board with different
political preferences and labor agenda could reach a different
conclusion.101
Goodwill Industries of Denver demonstrates the importance of
how the Board classifies a group of employees: its classification
determines whether the client/employees are able to share in the
benefits of NLRA protections and collective bargaining agreement
terms. The case also illustrates how the Board can grant important
rights based on slim distinctions that are subject to easy manipula-
tion.
D. Problems with the Current Multifactor Test
The current “typically industrial, primarily rehabilitative” test
has two main problems: political manipulation and inconsistency.
A review of the Board’s decisions shows ascertaining the political
party holding the majority of seats on the Board is the best way to
predict whether the Board will grant NLRA protections to rehabili-
tative employees. When Republicans hold a majority of the seats,
the Board declines to grant NLRA protections; when Democrats
hold a majority, the Board grants NLRA protections.102 The second
problem is that the test is inconsistent. Even within a single
controversy, regional directors, the Board, and federal courts come
to contrary conclusions even though the facts before each body are
identical. The following chart is useful for understanding both of
these problems.103
100. Id.
101. For more on the impact of political ideology on the outcome of Board decisions, see
infra Part III.D.
102. See infra fig.1.
103. Figure 1 is based on the cases listed supra note 27 and a listing of the political parties
of Board members available online at NLRB, Board Members Since 1935, http://www.nlrb
.gov/About_Us/Overview/board/board_members_since_1935.aspx (last visited Oct. 13, 2010).
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NLRA Protections for Rehabilitative Employees
Figure 1
Figure 1 demonstrates that the current test is susceptible to
political manipulation. Of the fourteen published Board decisions on
rehabilitative employees since 1960, all decisions declining to
extend NLRA protections to rehabilitative employees occurred when
there was a Republican majority on the Board.104 In every case
decided with a Democratic majority, the Board extended NLRA
protections to the rehabilitative employees.105 The political prefer-
ences of the Board seem to be the decisive factor in the “typically
industrial, primarily rehabilitative” test.106 The politicization of the
determination adds some predictability to the decisions, but
predicting outcomes on the basis of political power is an unsatisfy-
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104. In only one case did a Republican Board grant NLRA protections to rehabilitative
employees, and in that case the employer stipulated that the employees were section 2(3)
employees entitled to NLRA protections. See Chi. Lighthouse for the Blind, 225 N.L.R.B. 249,
249 (1976). 
105. See supra fig.1. Note that Goodwill of North Georgia, which granted rights to
rehabilitative employees, was decided by an equally divided Board, with two Republicans and
two Democrats.
106. Id.
107. See James J. Brudney, Isolated and Politicized: The NLRB’s Uncertain Future, 26
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 221, 243-52 (2005). 
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Figure 1 also demonstrates that the current test is difficult to
administer and yields unpredictable results within a single con-
troversy. If regional director, Board, and federal court decisions are
considered together, eight of the fourteen cases had at least one
reviewing body overturn a lower body’s NLRA coverage determina-
tion.108 Reasonable minds can evaluate the same facts of each case,
apply the test, and yet come to opposite results. 
This lack of consistency is a serious problem with the current test.
Without consistency, it is difficult for rehabilitative employees,
unions, and employers to know when they can rely on their NLRA
rights. Because some of the rehabilitative employees may work for
the rehabilitative employer for the rest of their lives,109 this lack of
certainty may put such employees in fear of exercising valuable
workplace protections for their entire career. If the NLRA actually
covers certain employees, then they deserve to know their rights,
and the Board ought to adopt policies that will make clear to
employees their rights.
Federal courts have criticized the Board for its lack of consistency
in applying the rehabilitative employee test. As a result, they refuse
to enforce Board orders requiring employers to recognize and
bargain with units containing rehabilitative employees.110 One court
held that “the Board did not adequately distinguish [the] case from
its precedent,” so it refused to remand the case to the Board for
further factual findings and reversed the Board’s decision on its
own.111 Another court bluntly stated that the Board “clearly erred”
in its decision to grant employee status to certain rehabilitative
employees.112 A third court stated that it refused to “rubber stamp”
the Board’s conclusion that certain workers were not rehabilitative
108. See supra fig.1.
109. Abilities & Goodwill, Inc., 226 N.L.R.B. 1224, 1224 (1976).
110. Balt. Goodwill Indus., Inc. v. NLRB, 134 F.3d 227, 231 (4th Cir. 1998) (per curiam),
denying enforcement to 154 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1015 (Apr. 30, 1996); Davis Mem’l Goodwill Indus.
v. NLRB, 108 F.3d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1997), denying enforcement to 318 N.L.R.B. 1044 (1995);
Ark. Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 185 (8th Cir. 1988), denying enforcement
to 284 N.L.R.B. 1214 (1987).
111. Balt. Goodwill, 134 F.3d at 231; see also Davis Mem’l, 108 F.3d at 413 (“The Board has
had its chance to develop a record that would distinguish the instant case from its [precedent]
and has failed.”).
112. Ark. Lighthouse, 851 F.2d at 185.
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employees.113 Federal courts are supposed to be incredibly deferen-
tial toward Board decisions,114 so the rebellion indicates that the
current test has serious flaws.
The rebuttable presumptions proposed by this Note will reduce
the likelihood of political manipulation and will increase certainty
within a single controversy. In close cases like Goodwill Industries
of Denver, a rebuttable presumption will tip the scale either toward
or against coverage, depending on the length of time the employee
has worked for the employer. By making employment duration the
determinative factor absent special circumstances, the ability for
the Board’s political policy preferences to decide close cases with
ambiguous “typically industrial, primarily rehabilitative” factors
will decrease. The rebuttable presumptions also will give other
reviewing bodies better guidance in making coverage decisions.
IV. THE FIRST PROPOSED PRESUMPTION: DENY NLRA RIGHTS FOR
AN INITIAL PERIOD UPON HIRING
The first prong of the proposed test for classifying workers creates
a rebuttable presumption that rehabilitative employees are not
section 2(3) employees for an initial period upon hiring, unless the
employee can show through a preponderance of the evidence that he
or she is not receiving rehabilitative services. Through rulemaking,
empirical studies, and public comment, the Board could determine
an appropriate initial time period for this presumption to remain
in effect.115 However, because the Board is loathe to engage in
113. Davis Mem’l, 108 F.3d at 410 (internal quotations omitted).
114. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (“[E]ven as to matters
not requiring expertise a court may [not] displace the Board’s choice between two fairly
conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had
the matter been before it de novo.”); NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d
399, 404 (5th Cir. 1983) (“In reviewing the Board’s ultimate conclusions, it is not the court’s
function to substitute its own inferences of fact for the Board’s ... The Board’s determination
that specified persons are ‘employees’ under the Act is to be accepted if it has ‘warrant in the
record’ and a reasonable basis in law.” (quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
130-31 (1944))) (omissions in original); see also id. at 406 (“Even if subsequent cases reaching
the opposite result are truly indistinguishable, it is not our province to ensure an abstract and
academic consistency in Board decisions.” (quoting NLRB v. Deaton, Inc., 502 F.2d 1221, 1228
(5th Cir. 1974))).
115. See Brudney, supra note 107, at 235-36 (arguing that the Board would engage in
empirical studies if it began rulemaking).
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rulemaking and usually sets standards through adjudication,116 it
could pick any time period it pleased. This Note selects six months
as an appropriate initial period, recognizing that different periods
may also be entirely appropriate.
This presumption will allow the rehabilitative employer to pro-
vide its services for six months without interference from unions
and other individuals engaged in section 7 activities. Employees
could rebut the presumption by presenting evidence that they were
not receiving any rehabilitation in the first six-month period. This
six-month rebuttable presumption creates certainty for the em-
ployer ex ante. For example, if the client/employees in Goodwill
Industries of Denver had worked for Goodwill for less than six
months, they presumptively would not be covered by the NLRA. The
first presumption thus makes what was a narrow determination
into one clearly tipped toward no coverage.
Several policy reasons support this initial presumption, many of
which the Board has used to decline NLRA protections to rehabilita-
tive employees in the past. First, several federal programs encour-
age the employment of individuals with disabilities or other im-
pairments. Second, allowing NLRA protections may actually do
more harm than good for rehabilitative employees. Because these
arguments have significant weaknesses, Part V limits the impact of
the first presumption by imposing a contrary second presumption
after six months.
A. Federal Policy Indicates that Employees Receiving           
Rehabilitation Should Not Have NLRA Protections
Those opposing NLRA coverage for rehabilitative employees can
justify their position by pointing to several federal programs that
encourage the employment of rehabilitative employees. The Javits-
Wagner-O’Day Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the special
minimum wage provisions in Fair Labor Standards Act, and the
NLRA collectively show that Congress intended rehabilitative
employees to have as many employment opportunities as possible,
even if creating these opportunities requires removing other
116. Id. at 234-37.
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ordinary federal protections.117 NLRA protections for rehabilitative
employees would limit employment opportunities and hinder
Congress’s pro-employment agenda, so during the time that the
employer is actively providing rehabilitation, rehabilitative em-
ployees should not receive NLRA protections.
1. The Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act
Congress passed the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act (JWOD) in order
to provide blind and severely handicapped individuals the opportu-
nity to obtain gainful employment.118 JWOD allows nonprofit
organizations to qualify for governmental contracts to produce
certain commodities and services so long as 75 percent of the man-
hours come from the blind or severely handicapped.119 Through the
program, individuals with disabilities assemble “mops, brooms,
pillow cases, ball-point pens, box springs, mattresses, signal flags,
brushes, mattress pads and dish towels” and similar items.120 They
also provide janitorial services and assist with inventory stocking.121 
Congress was unapologetic in describing one of the major pur-
poses of JWOD. The House explained that it wanted to turn
individuals who would otherwise be a financial burden on their
families or the government into productive “wage earners and tax
payers.”122 To further that end, Congress intended for JWOD to pro-
vide a constant stream of employment to those who would otherwise
have great difficulty in obtaining paying jobs.123 During the last
major revision to JWOD in 1971, the House expressed concerns that
117. This Note acknowledges Catherine Bean’s helpful research in this area. She outlined
how the Javits-Wagner-O’Day Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act
may be construed to show strong congressional support of the employment of rehabilitative
employees. See Bean, supra note 5, at 359-69.
118. H.R. REP. NO. 92-228, at 1-2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1079, 1080.
119. 41 U.S.C. §§ 47, 48(b)(3) (2006).
120. H.R. REP. NO. 92-228, at 1, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1080.
121. Goodwill Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. 764, 764 (1991).
122. H.R. REP. NO. 92-228, at 2, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1080; see also Bean,
supra note 5, at 360.
123. H.R. REP. NO. 92-228, at 13, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1091-92 (noting the
need to ensure that the program was available to those “incapable of engaging in regular
competitive employment”).
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a scarcity of resources would decrease job opportunities.124 Congress
believed that it was vital that individuals with disabilities remained
employed, and thus took steps to make more money available for the
program.125
The number of rehabilitative cases that the Board has decided
involving JWOD shows how important the program is to providing
job opportunities to individuals with disabilities. JWOD provided
funding to employers in at least nine of the fourteen cases involving
rehabilitative employees.126 Thus, those opposing NLRA coverage of
rehabilitative employees may argue plausibly against covering such
employees on the basis that anything that increases employer costs
will reduce the beneficial impact of these funds. Unionization
increases employer costs,127 and therefore granting NLRA rights to
rehabilitative employers would contribute to the resource scarcity
that concerned Congress when it last revised JWOD.
2. Vocational Rehabilitation Programs
Congress passed the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 in order to expand
state-run programs that help individuals with job-related disabili-
ties to obtain gainful employment.128 The goal of vocational rehabili-
tation (VR) is to prepare individuals for a career outside of the
rehabilitative environment, if possible.129 Congress believed the
financial benefits of VR programs greatly outweighed their expense,
estimating cash returns running anywhere from three to five times
the government’s outlay.130
124. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1083-84 (“[Due to a lack of funding], the
work available to the workshops has diminished so that the vocational rehabilitation program
of the severely handicapped is faltering. It is essential that the workshops have work.”).
125. Id.
126. See supra note 27. Of those cases, only Key Opportunities, Goodwill Industries of
Southern California, Chicago Lighthouse, Epi-Hab, and Sheltered Workshops of San Diego do
not mention JWOD funding.
127. See, e.g., Davis Mem’l Goodwill Indus. v. NLRB, 108 F.3d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(describing how NLRA rights drive up costs and limit the ability of a rehabilitative employer
to provide services to needy individuals).
128. Pub. L. No. 93-112 pmbl. & § 2(1), 87 Stat. 355, 355-57 (1973) (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. § 701(b) (2006)).
129. Id. § 501(c), 87 Stat. at 391 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 791); see also Bean,
supra note 5, at 368.
130. S. REP. NO. 93-318, at 9 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2085-86.
630 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:607
As with JWOD, the Rehabilitation Act demonstrates Congress’s
desire to assist those with barriers to employment to overcome their
challenges and to become productive citizens.131 Unionism would
limit opportunities for rehabilitation because higher costs would
limit the number of available positions and force employers to retain
the most profitable employees instead of those most in need of
rehabilitation services.132 Therefore, granting NLRA protections to
rehabilitative employees would be counterproductive and contrary
to Congress’s intent in passing the Rehabilitation Act.
3. Reduced Minimum Wages
Because Congress values the employment of individuals with
disabilities, it has shown a willingness to limit normal employment
laws in order to foster their employment.133 For example, the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA) provides for a national minimum
wage.134 The FLSA has an exception, however, for individuals with
disabilities.135 Employers may apply for a certificate that allows
them to pay employees with disabilities a variable rate depending
on the individual’s productivity in comparison to similarly employed
workers without disabilities in the same community.136 In one
instance, an employer paid his employees only 8 percent of the
minimum wage.137 House members noted that some individuals with
disabilities would be unable to find employment in the normal
market if their employers had to pay a regular minimum wage.138
Congress thus decided to abandon a minimum wage for individuals
with disabilities—even if fractionally based on the minimum
wage—because requiring an artificially high pay level would reduce
such workers’ employability.139 If Congress is willing to remove a
131. See Bean, supra note 5, at 367-68.
132. See Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537-38 (1977).
133. See Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 214(c) (2006).
134. Id. § 206.
135. Id. § 214(c).
136. Id. § 214(c)(1)(5); see also 29 C.F.R. § 525.9(a) (2009).
137. See S. REP. NO. 87-145, at 1, 43 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1620, 1620,
1665 (noting the proposed minimum wage increase to $1.25 for nonsheltered workshop
employees, while some sheltered workshops were paying rehabilitative employees only $0.10).
138. 132 CONG. REC. H8825-01 (1986).
139. Id.; see also Bean, supra note 5, at 364-65.
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basic employment protection—the minimum wage—from employees
with disabilities who would otherwise be unable to find a job, it
stands to reason that Congress would similarly allow the removal
of another set of employment rights—NLRA protections—for the
same purpose.
4. The NLRA Was Not Intended To Protect Rehabilitative
Employees
Finally, anticoverage Board members have argued that the NLRA
itself was never intended to apply to rehabilitative employees.140
One major purpose of the NLRA was to prevent the exploitation of
workers.141 Because rehabilitative employers are not exploiting
employees, but are rather conferring benefits upon them, the NLRA
is not intended to govern this relationship.142 Furthermore, although
there have been congressional attempts to amend the NLRA in
order to protect rehabilitative employees, these attempts never
moved beyond the committee level.143 The failure of these bills may
show that Congress understood the nature of these relationships
and intentionally did not grant rehabilitative employees NLRA
rights.144
B. NLRA Protections Would Not Benefit Rehabilitative Employees
and May Hurt Them
At times, the Board has argued that rehabilitative employees
would not gain anything if they had NLRA rights.145 In rehabilita-
tive employer situations, the anticoverage advocates believe that the
employer is providing all of the benefits that a union could provide,
and perhaps in some ways is even more concerned about the
140. See, e.g., Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 984-88 (2004) (pointing
to the text of the NLRA and congressional policy to show that the NLRA was not intended to
govern the rehabilitative relationship).
141. See Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1374 (1982).
142. Id.
143. See Cincinnati Ass’n for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567, 570 (6th Cir. 1982)
(collecting seven failed bills).
144. But see id. (finding this argument unpersuasive).
145. See Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 538 (1977).
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rehabilitative employees’ welfare than a union would be.146 In
Goodwill Industries of Southern California, the Teamsters sought
to include transportation and production workers with various
employment disabilities in a bargaining unit.147 The employment
disabilities included “mental or emotional disturbance” and physical
limitations, but also included employment barriers such as limited
education and criminal records.148 
After considering the presence of a job placement program, job
training, counseling services, minimal discipline, and the absence
of production standards, the Board determined that NLRA pro-
tections would be inappropriate for these employees.149 The Board
justified its position by arguing that in the rehabilitative employer
situation, an employer’s “concern for the welfare of his employees
competes with, and in some sense displaces, the union’s ordinary
concern for employee well-being.”150 The Board noted that unions
usually seek to improve working conditions for employees, but in
this case, the employer had “avowedly and convincingly” pursued
that objective.151 If the employer had to meet usual union demands
for higher pay, job security, and benefits, then the employer would
have less money to employ individuals with disabilities and would
have fewer openings for them.152 The Board concluded that rehabili-
tative employees were therefore better off without NLRA rights
than with them.153
Pragmatically, anticoverage advocates also have suggested that
rehabilitative employers are providing these employees with steady
jobs with steady pay—perhaps the only jobs for which the employees
could qualify.154 If rehabilitative employees become too troublesome,
then benevolent employers would simply stop providing services.155
146. Id.
147. Id. at 536-37.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 537.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 537-38.
153. Id. at 538.
154. See NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 653 F.2d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 1981),
rev’d on reh’g, 696 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1983).
155. See Ark. Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 183 (8th Cir. 1988)
(“[Applying NLRA protections] discourag[es] the formation and operation of nonprofit projects
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Employees with special needs may find it difficult to find work
without rehabilitation, so the Board should not adopt policies that
would enable interference with rehabilitation.156
C. Anticoverage Arguments Justify Removing NLRA Protections
in Certain Cases
Because federal policy prefers employment and rehabilitation of
workers with disabilities to the alternative of equal rights, the
Board should not grant NLRA protections to rehabilitative employ-
ees so long as actual rehabilitation is occurring. If the NLRA were
to apply to these employees, employers’ operating costs would
increase.157 As a result, either fewer employees would be employed
or employers would be forced to retain only the most productive
workers instead of serving those most in need of rehabilitation.158
Responding to these concerns, this Note proposes that the Board
adopt a rebuttable presumption that the NLRA does not cover
rehabilitative employees for the first six months that they work for
an employer. With this presumption, employers’ costs will remain
low and they will have a strong incentive to provide continuously
the rehabilitation that their employees need in order to enter the
general workforce.
V. THE SECOND PROPOSED PRESUMPTION: GRANT NLRA RIGHTS
AFTER THE INITIAL REHABILITATIVE PERIOD
Those in favor of granting NLRA protections to rehabilitative
employees have pointed out several weaknesses in the anticover-
age position. First, they argue that the federal policies used by
to aid and assist therapeutic and rehabilitative efforts to employ the handicapped.”). One
employer threatened rehabilitative employees that a union would cause the workplace to be
“closed up tight as a jug and never reopened” like three other sheltered workshops that had
attempted unionization. Ark. Lighthouse for the Blind, 284 N.L.R.B. 1214, 1218 (1987).
156. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 988 (2004) (expressing fears of
interfering with the rehabilitative process); Goodwill Indus. of Denver, 304 N.L.R.B. 764, 764
(1991) (same); Bean, supra note 5, at 387 (“To allow unregulated negotiations between parties
with little understanding of the special place in society of the handicapped could be
devastating for the parties involved.”).
157. See Davis Mem’l Goodwill Indus. v. NLRB, 108 F.3d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
158. Goodwill Indus. of S. Cal., 231 N.L.R.B. 536, 537-38 (1977).
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those opposing coverage are, at best, inconclusive evidence re-
garding whether the NLRA should cover rehabilitative employees.
Pro-coverage advocates instead point to other federal laws, like
the ADA, that suggest the Board should not treat rehabilitative
employees differently than ordinary employees. Second, those
favoring coverage question the belief that an employer’s benevolence
merits any sort of reduction of rights for its workers or that rehab-
ilitative employees are not working hard enough to be considered
employees.159 Third, pro-coverage advocates harbor a real fear of
sham rehabilitation centers—a fear that has a substantial basis
due to reported employer abuses of the rehabilitative employee
system.160
These pro-coverage arguments are persuasive, indicating that a
blanket denial of NLRA protections for rehabilitative employees
would be inappropriate. As a result, this Note proposes a second
rebuttable presumption that would become effective after an initial
period with the rehabilitative employer. As discussed in Part IV, the
initial rebuttable presumption would last for six months.161 After
six months, there would be a second rebuttable presumption that
the rehabilitative employees are true employees, and thus entitled
to NLRA rights and protections. The employer could rebut this pre-
sumption by presenting a preponderance of the evidence that the
employer was providing the workers in question actual, material
rehabilitation services on a regular basis. As with the first presump-
tion, this second presumption is well supported by policy arguments
and workplace realities.
A. Federal Policy Does Not Demonstrate Congressional Intent To
Exclude Rehabilitative Employees; In Fact, Congress Affirmatively
Provides Protection
Those favoring NLRA rights for rehabilitative employees argue
that the anticoverage advocates have misinterpreted federal intent
with respect to rehabilitative employees. They also argue that the
NLRA’s plain language specifically encompasses rehabilitative
159. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
160. See infra Part V.C (discussing sham rehabilitation centers).
161. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text. 
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employees. Furthermore, the ADA expressly attempts to create
equality for rehabilitative employees, so as a result, these employees
should have equal NLRA rights.
1. Rebutting Federal Policy Arguments Addressed by
Anticoverage Advocates
The Board, when composed of pro-coverage members, has argued
twice that JWOD, the Rehabilitation Act, and the FLSA’s variable
wage provision fail to indicate that Congress intended to exclude
rehabilitative employees from NLRA protections.162 In one case, the
Board petitioned the Fifth Circuit for enforcement of an order
requiring a rehabilitative employer to bargain with its rehabilitative
employees.163 The Board used an amicus brief from the Secretary of
Labor to persuade the court that the reduced minimum wage
provisions of the FLSA had no bearing on interpreting congressional
intent toward rehabilitative employees.164 The Secretary of Labor
asserted that the minimum wage program was a different issue
than labor rights and that the court should not consider the FLSA
in determining whether the employees should have NLRA rights.165
The court ultimately agreed with the Board and declared that it
could not find any congressional intent in JWOD, the Rehabilitation
Act, or the FLSA that would require rehabilitative employees to be
excluded from NLRA protections.166
The Sixth Circuit agreed with this analysis in a similar case.167
The court noted that although these federal statutes show
Congress’s willingness to extend employment opportunities to
individuals with disabilities, this willingness did not necessarily
demonstrate that Congress intended to exclude rehabilitative em-
ployees from NLRA coverage.168 The court decided that the presence
of JWOD, the Rehabilitation Act, and the FLSA was not dispositive





166. Id. at 404 n.21.
167. Cincinnati Ass’n for the Blind v. NLRB, 672 F.2d 567, 570-71 (6th Cir. 1982).
168. Id. at 571.
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and that the court “simply lack[ed] a basis on which to make an
informed judgment about ‘Congressional intent’ in this area.”169
Thus, on two occasions, a pro-coverage Board has successfully
questioned the validity of federal policy arguments against NLRA
protections for rehabilitative employees. 
2. The NLRA Covers Rehabilitative Employees
Due to the plain language of the NLRA, pro-coverage activists
believe that rehabilitative employees are entitled to the NLRA’s
protections. Members Wilma B. Liebman and Dennis P. Walsh
argued this position with passion when dissenting in Brevard
Achievement Center, Inc.170 They cited the Supreme Court’s expan-
sive understanding of a section 2(3) “employee” in Sure-Tan, Inc. v.
NLRB.171 In Sure-Tan, the Court ruled that undocumented aliens
were employees within the meaning of the NLRA because “the Act
squarely applies to ‘any employee.’”172 The Brevard dissent also
pointed to other Supreme Court cases that suggested that a worker
is a section 2(3) employee if he or she has a master-servant relation-
ship with the employer,173 or if the worker falls within a dictionary
definition of “employee.”174 Because many rehabilitative employees
are working just like ordinary employees, they meet both dictionary
and common law definitions of “employee,” and thus, the Brevard
dissent argued, they are statutory employees under section 2(3) and
are entitled to protections under the NLRA.175
This plain-language argument is persuasive; however, it is
subject to a significant counterargument that causes this Note to
stop short of recommending NLRA protections for rehabilitative
employees at all times and in all cases. Those opposing coverage
could point to the irony of selecting Sure-Tan in order to prove that
169. Id.
170. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 990-92 (2004) (Members Liebman
and Walsh, dissenting).
171. Id. at 991.
172. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 891 (1984).
173. Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 990 (citing NLRB v. Town & Country Elec., Inc., 516 U.S.
85, 94 (1995)).
174. Id. (citing NLRB v. Ky. River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001)).
175. Id. at 989.
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rehabilitative employees are covered by the NLRA.176 In Sure-Tan,
the Court held that, although the illegal immigrants were entitled
to the NLRA’s protections, their special status barred them from
receiving a remedy of backpay or reinstatement.177 Even though the
employer had violated the NLRA, the Board was obligated to
consider other “equally important Congressional objective[s]” like
immigration policies prior to ordering a remedy.178 These counter-
vailing policies meant that even though the employer violated the
NLRA, the Board could not order a remedy.179 
Applying Sure-Tan, the Board could theoretically find that the
NLRA covers rehabilitative employees, but then could refuse to
grant a remedy due to the strong countervailing congressional
policies addressing rehabilitative employees. By creating two classes
of employees—those with remedies and those without remedies—
the Supreme Court has weakened the effectiveness of the Brevard
dissent’s otherwise persuasive plain-meaning approach toward
applying the NLRA to rehabilitative employees. Nevertheless, after
a period of time, rehabilitative employees begin to resemble ordi-
nary employees more and more, and the force of countervailing
congressional policies favoring rehabilitation begins to weaken as
the need for rehabilitation declines. As a result, this Note adopts the
second presumption after the initial six-month period in order to
conform to this plain-meaning approach to the NLRA’s coverage.
3. The Americans with Disabilities Act
Pro-coverage advocates fervently point to the ADA as the true in-
dication of congressional intent toward rehabilitative employees.180
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, and amended it in 2008 to re-
emphasize the ADA’s importance in light of general underappli-
176. Id. at 991.
177. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 898-906; see also id. at 911 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part)
(dissenting due to the Court-created anomaly that the workers were protected by the NLRA
but deprived of an effective remedy).
178. Id. at 903 (majority opinion) (quoting S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 47 (1942)).
179. Id. at 911 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part).
180. See Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 990, 994 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting)
(citing the ADA as a principal reason for extending NLRA rights to rehabilitative employees).
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cation by the courts.181 Congress passed the ADA so that individuals
with disabilities could enter into ordinary economic and social
interactions without discrimination.182 Congress envisioned the
federal government playing a central role in eliminating disability
discrimination.183 One House Report states,
The Act is premised on the obligation of employers to consider
people with disabilities as individuals and to avoid prejudging
what an applicant or employee can or cannot do on the basis of
that individual’s appearance or any other easily identifiable
characteristic, or on a preconceived and often erroneous judg-
ment about an individual’s capabilities based on “labeling” of
that person as having a particular kind of disability.184
Even though the Board, as an adjudicator of labor disputes, is not
a “covered entity” under the ADA,185 Congress did declare that it
expected that the federal government—implying its agencies—
would take a lead role in eliminating discrimination on the basis of
disabilities.186 The Board, by prejudging rehabilitative employees on
the basis of their disabilities, is violating the spirit, if not the letter,
of the ADA.187
The ADA argument is highly persuasive. Nonetheless, upon
inspection, it suffers from significant limitations, so this Note does
not propose blanket NLRA rights for rehabilitative employees. First,
the core element of an ADA violation is discrimination on the basis
of disability.188 Anticoverage Board members strongly argue that the
Board is not differentiating between rehabilitative employees and
regular employees on the basis of their disabilities, but rather on
181. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325 § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553-54 (2008)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006)) (expressing Congress’s disappointment with the
judiciary’s undue narrowing of the ADA).
182. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 446.
183. Id.
184. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 58 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 340.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2006) (“The term ‘covered entity’ means an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, or joint labor-management committee.”).
186. See H.R. REP NO. 101-485(III), at 23, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 446.
187. See Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 990 (2004) (Members Liebman
and Walsh, dissenting).
188. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual
because of the disability.”) (emphasis added).
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the basis of their relationship to the employer.189 The distinction,
though subtle, is crucial. 
Second, the ADA and the NLRA have a stormy relationship,
which suggests that the Board may disregard portions of the ADA.
Many of the ADA’s provisions conflict with basic labor law provi-
sions.190 For instance, if an employer makes reasonable accommo-
dations required under the ADA without union consent, the union
could file charges with the Board because the employer violated
the NLRA by enacting a unilateral change.191 Although the ADA
requires employers to consult individuals with disabilities regarding
reasonable accommodations, these discussions may violate NLRA
prohibitions against direct dealing.192 The ADA duty to keep em-
ployee disability information confidential may conflict with an
NLRA duty to disclose relevant information to the union for
bargaining purposes.193 These conflicts are so intractable that the
NLRB and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission have
been unable to compromise on a joint solution to resolve ADA and
NLRA conflicts.194 In one instance, the Supreme Court has ruled in
favor of the NLRA’s prerogatives to the subordination of typical
ADA rights.195 Because ADA rights occasionally are subordinated to
NLRA prerogatives, it stands to reason that the Board could also act
contrary to the spirit of the ADA in certain instances.
The ADA argument standing by itself would suggest that the
Board should never differentiate between rehabilitative employees
and other employees and should always grant NLRA protections to
189. Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 988 (majority opinion).
190. See Stephen M. Crow & Sandra J. Hartman, ADA Versus NLRA: Is a Showdown
Imminent Over Reasonable Accommodation?, 44 LAB. L.J. 375 (1993); Ann C. Hodges, The
Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567, 610-14
(1994); Robert W. Pritchard, Avoiding the Inevitable: Resolving the Conflicts Between the ADA
and the NLRA, 11 LAB. LAW. 375 (1995).
191. Pritchard, supra note 190, at 388-89.
192. Crow & Hartman, supra note 190, at 379.
193. Hodges, supra note 190, at 603, 610-14.
194. Pritchard, supra note 190, at 405 (citing EEOC Suspends Efforts To Work with NLRB
on Issuing Joint Memo on Disabilities Act, [1992] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 160, at A-3 (Aug.
18, 1992)).
195. See U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002) (holding that an employee with
disabilities who had been assigned to a less physically demanding position could not
successfully sue under the ADA if another employee under the union’s seniority system ousted
the employee with disabilities due to the senior employee’s seniority).
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rehabilitative employees. However, the anticoverage arguments are
formidable, so this Note does not propose a rule that would require
NLRA protections for rehabilitative employees at all times.
B. The Anticoverage View Is Tainted by Undue Paternalism and
Outdated Stereotypes
Those favoring NLRA protections for rehabilitative employees
criticize the anticoverage advocates’ arguments for assuming either
that rehabilitative employees are not working and lack the capacity
to use NLRA rights or that the employer is exceedingly benevolent.
Pro-coverage advocates balk at the idea that rehabilitative employ-
ees are not working hard enough to earn the employer’s services.196
In the earliest rehabilitative employer case, Sheltered Workshops of
San Diego, Inc., Chairman Boyd S. Leedom and Member Steven S.
Bean dissented from the Board’s decision to decline jurisdiction over
a rehabilitative employer due to the employer’s charitable
purposes.197 They noted that the rehabilitative employees were
actually working like normal employees—they were introducing
goods into the stream of commerce, were receiving pay for their
services, and were subject to layoffs when work slowed.198 Being in
essence hard-working employees, those favoring coverage believe
that rehabilitative employees should not be denied the right to
collective bargaining, notwithstanding the rehabilitative services
the employer may provide.199
Pro-coverage advocates would also question the sincerity of an
employer’s benevolence if it seeks to deny NLRA rights to its
rehabilitative employees. As Chairman Leedom and Member Bean
stated, “[W]e reject the implicit corollary that a nonprofit organiza-
tion engaging in socially beneficial activities therefore owes its
employees less than other employers do.”200 Pro-coverage activists
196. See Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 994 (2004) (Members Liebman
and Walsh, dissenting).
197. Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 961, 964-65 (1960) (Chairman
Leedom and Member Bean, dissenting).
198. Id.; see also Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 990 (pointing to similar indicia of true work).
199. Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, 126 N.L.R.B. at 965 (Chairman Leedom and
Member Bean, dissenting).
200. Id.
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argue that if the employer is truly interested in rehabilitating the
employees, it will give the employee an experience that closely
parallels the ordinary workforce.201 As a result, the employer will
allow them the interpersonal interactions and responsibilities that
go hand-in-hand with collective bargaining and union representa-
tion.202 In essence, they believe that dealing with pressures regard-
ing unionization is a job skill worth acquiring in the rehabilitation
stage.203
Recently, dissenting Board members labeled the Board’s desire
not to interfere with rehabilitation “paternalistic” and “stereo-
typ[ical].”204 This accusation has some substance. In a prior case, the
Board supported its decision not to grant NLRA protections to a
group of rehabilitative employees by suggesting that they lacked
the capacity to collectively bargain.205 Although the Board has
more recently admitted that rehabilitative employees do have the
capacity to collectively bargain,206 the earlier position still seems to
affect Board thinking and casts doubt on the credibility of the
anticoverage position.
In contrast to these stereotypical notions, the modern sentiment
is that individuals with disabilities have the capacity to choose their
own destinies and that people seeking to protect them should not
foreclose their choices.207 The Board has a mandate to give employ-
ees free choice in exercising their NLRA rights.208 Even though
workers often are harmed in the process, the Board’s attempts to
save rehabilitative employees from themselves are ill-founded. If the
Board truly wanted to adopt a paternalistic, protective stance, it




205. Key Opportunities, Inc., 265 N.L.R.B. 1371, 1375 (1982) (“[The NLRA] is predicated
on the ability of employees to choose to act or refrain from acting in concert with others.”)
(emphasis added).
206. Brevard, 342 N.L.R.B. at 988 (majority opinion) (“We do not exclude these persons
because of any assumption that they are incapable of engaging in the collective-bargaining
process.”).
207. Id. at 989 n.1 (Members Liebman and Walsh, dissenting) (collecting policy studies and
governmental efforts to extend equal rights and opportunities to individuals with disabilities).
208. See, e.g., NLRA § 9(b), 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (2006) (requiring the Board to determine
bargaining units so as to “assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this [Act]”).
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should find ways to discourage all employees from exercising their
NLRA rights. So often in attempting to use NLRA rights, employers
harass and even terminate employees, and due to the state of labor
law, many wrongs go unpunished.209 The bottom line is that there
is no “reasonableness” test to using NLRA rights, so even if the
employees act unreasonably in such a way that provokes the em-
ployer to terminate them, the employees are protected.210 Rather
than enforcing paternalism, and in recognition of the modern trend
toward granting individuals with disabilities equal rights, opportu-
nities, and risks, this Note proposes that after six months, rehabili-
tative employees presumptively should receive full NLRA benefits.
C. Denying Rights Exposes Long-Term Rehabilitative Employees
to Exploitation
Evidence also exists that some ostensibly well-intentioned
employers actually may be exploiting their federal protections in
order to reap greater profits.211 In other words, the employer is using
federal programs and policies to run what is essentially a sweat-
shop. Coverage proponents fear that employers are able to hide
behind a rehabilitative screen while not actually providing any
extraordinary services to employees.212 In sham rehabilitation cases,
employees should be able to act collectively to recapture some of the
benefits that the employer is retaining.
Accusations of rehabilitative employer abuse have existed for
decades. In 1973, Congress ordered a special investigation into
the value of rehabilitation centers after hearing that employers
were giving only marginal services to their employees and then
“dump[ing]” those with severe handicaps after the employees’
209. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, UNFAIR ADVANTAGE: WORKERS’ FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION IN
THE UNITED STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 13-14 (2004), available
at http://www.hrw.org/reports/pdfs/u/us/uslbr008.pdf.
210. C.f. In re Odyssey Capital Group, L.P., 337 N.L.R.B. 1110, 1111 (2002) (reiterating
that “reasonableness” is not a factor to be considered in determining whether concerted
actions are protected under the NLRA).
211. E.g., Jeff Kosseff et al., Charity Leaders Prosper as “Disabled” is Redefined,
OREGONIAN, Mar. 5, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Kosseff, Charity Leaders Prosper].
212. See Sheltered Workshops of San Diego, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 961, 965 (1960) (Chairman
Leedom and Member Bean, dissenting).
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federal funding expired in order to take on a new crop of workers.213
More recently, other rehabilitative employers have been accused
of hiring only the mildly disabled to perform complicated skilled
work while retaining six-figure executive salaries.214 Some of these
nominally disabled individuals are able to complete difficult work,
such as repairing battle-damaged military humvees.215 As one
observer noted, “If they can do that work, they’re competitively
employable.”216 Perhaps most troublesome, many small, true reha-
bilitative employers are unable to get federal contracts because they
are unable to compete with skill sets possessed by these nominally
disabled workers.217
Sham rehabilitation centers have several common features. The
“training” provided to the employees often sounds remarkably like
normal on-the-job training.218 In sham centers, even if rehabilitative
services are theoretically available, employees often do not know
about them or do not take advantage of them.219 Turnover may be
very low, suggesting that there is an ordinary employment relation-
ship because the target of true rehabilitation is employee placement
outside of the rehabilitation program.220 In addition, some of the
rehabilitation benefits are actually just the “normal and usual grist
for the mill of collective bargaining.”221 Those favoring NLRA pro-
tections for rehabilitative employees could argue that the rehabilita-
tive employee has gained nothing of real value aside from what an
ordinary employee could gain from his or her employer, and thus
213. S. REP. NO. 93-318, at 43 (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2120.




218. Goodwill Indus. of Tidewater, Inc., 304 N.L.R.B. 767, 768 (1991) (describing training
in “general office cleaning, cleaning of restrooms, supplying soap and bathroom tissue,
cleaning windows, and stripping, waxing, and buffing floors”).
219. See, e.g., Goodwill Indus. of N. Ga., 350 N.L.R.B. 32, 34 (2007) (“Hines, classified as
disabled, testified that she had been working for the Employer for approximately 6 years, that
she had been unaware of the existence of the career services division until the previous year,
and that she had never been assigned to a counselor or received any counseling.”); Davis
Mem’l Goodwill Indus., 318 N.L.R.B. 1044, 1047 (1995) (granting NLRA rights because
rehabilitative services, though present, were not an active part of the work environment).
220. Davis Mem’l Goodwill Indus. v. NLRB, 108 F.3d 406, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
221. NLRB v. Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 696 F.2d 399, 406 (5th Cir. 1983).
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they should not be treated differently because of any purported
rehabilitation that the employer supposedly provides.
D. The Second Presumption Balances the Pro-Coverage Position
with the Anticoverage Position and Creates Positive Incentives
The second presumption effectively addresses the pro-coverage
concerns about implementing affirmative federal directives to create
equality for individuals with disabilities. It also helps to undermine
stereotypical beliefs about the capacity of rehabilitative employees
and to prevent crooked employers from taking advantage of
rehabilitative employees without NLRA rights. In recognition of the
valid arguments advanced by anticoverage advocates, however, the
second presumption is not so broad as to extend NLRA protections
when the employer is actively providing rehabilitation. 
The second presumption creates several benefits. First, it forces
the employer to provide services actively and regularly in order to
avoid obligations under the NLRA. Actively providing services
advances federal rehabilitation policy. The employer has an added
incentive to notify employees of its rehabilitative services, which
helps to avoid situations where an employee could work for the
employer for years without knowing that help was available.222 This
presumption would also prevent illusory rehabilitation services from
blocking employees’ NLRA rights. If the employer refused to provide
rehabilitation services and was in reality running a sweatshop of
rehabilitative employees, then the employees could engage in NLRA
protected activities to capture some of the employer’s retained bene-
fits.223 
222. Goodwill Indus. of N. Ga., 350 N.L.R.B. at 33-34.
223. See Houston Lighthouse, 696 F.2d at 406 (observing that many rehabilitation benefits
could be obtained through collective bargaining).
2010]     REHABILITATIVE EMPLOYEES 645
                VI. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PROBLEMS WITH THE           
TWO-PRESUMPTION SOLUTION
A. Assumption that Providing Work Is Not a Rehabilitative 
Service
An employer may argue that providing work to individuals with
disabilities is rehabilitation by itself, even without active counsel-
ing, training, or job placement programs.224 The Board, if it chose,
could include the mere provision of work as evidence of rehabilita-
tion. The Board should not adopt such a position, however, because
it opens the door to sweatshop facilities without NLRA rights. In
other contexts, the Board does not consider the availability of work
in deciding whether to extend NLRA benefits. For example, small
towns may have one dominant employer, such as a major factory,
and yet those ordinary employees are not precluded from NLRA
rights on the basis that the employer is probably the only place most
of those employees could work. The Board should consider other
“typically industrial, primarily rehabilitative”225 factors like minimal
discipline, job placement programs, training, and counseling in
order to determine whether the employer is providing rehabilitation
rather than weighing the mere provision of work.
B. Incentivizing the Termination of Rehabilitative Employees After
the Initial Period
This Note’s proposed test, unfortunately, may encourage the
employer to terminate employees after six months once the
presumption switches over.226 But if the Board were generous and
consistent in determining what constituted rehabilitation, then the
employer could have confidence that its employees are not entitled
224. Ark. Lighthouse for the Blind v. NLRB, 851 F.2d 180, 183 (8th Cir. 1988) (“Work is
probably the most productive and successful method of rehabilitation for handicapped
persons.”).
225. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 993 (2004) (Members Liebman and
Walsh, dissenting).
226. Congress observed that this “dumping” problem occurred under the Rehabilitation Act
once federal funding expired. See S. REP. NO. 93-318, at 43 (1973), reprinted in 1973
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2076, 2120.
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to NLRA protections if it provides rehabilitative services. With this
confidence, the employer would be less likely to terminate employ-
ees just before the presumption switched because it could rebut
the presumption that the workers were section 2(3) employees.
Alternately, the employees could invoke the principle that it is an
unfair labor practice to refuse to hire an employee due to his or her
NLRA-protected activities.227 By firing rehabilitative employees just
before the six-month mark, employers essentially would be refusing
to “hire” due to NLRA rights. This threat or actual charge may be
enough of a deterrent to prevent the discriminatory discharges
because the remedy for such NLRA violations includes reinstate-
ment and backpay.228 Ultimately, even if the proposed presumptions
cause higher turnover rates, perhaps it is in the best interest of the
population of individuals with disabilities to have regular turnover
in order to make sure that as many such individuals as possible
have the opportunity for rehabilitation. 
C. Conflicts Between Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) and Maintaining
the Employer’s Right To Discharge for Cause
There could be a problem if the employer provides rehabilitative
services in order to discriminate against employees for exercising
their NLRA rights. This situation would arise when a formerly
rehabilitative employee continues to work for the rehabilitative
employer after that employee gains NLRA rights by the second
presumption. Renewing rehabilitative services would allow the
employer to rebut the second presumption, removing NLRA
protections. Sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) prohibit an employer from
interfering with an employee’s section 7 rights or from taking an
adverse employment action toward an employee due to that em-
ployee’s protected activities.229 Fortunately, this problem closely
parallels situations in which an employer attempts to promote an
employee to a supervisory position in order to remove that individ-
ual’s NLRA rights.230 In such cases, the Board’s focus is on whether
227. See Love’s Barbeque Rest. No. 62, 245 N.L.R.B. 78, 81 (1979).
228. See id. at 82.
229. NLRA § 8(a)(1), (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (2006).
230. E.g., In re Rugby Mfg. Co., No. 18-CA-15802-1, 2002 WL 2029505 (NLRB Div. of
Judges, Aug. 30, 2002) (finding NLRA violation when employer attempted to promote
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the employer had a discriminatory intent behind its actions.231 The
Board has plenty of experience in examining an employer’s motive
in these situations and would be able to find NLRA violations if the
employer did begin to discriminatorily provide rehabilitative ser-
vices to employees.232
Looking at the employer’s motivation also solves the problem of
protecting an employer’s right to terminate an employee for good
cause. If an employer discharges a former rehabilitative employee
from the rehabilitation program because the employee no longer
needs the services, that discharge would be for good cause. The
employer would have made room for a new individual who needs the
program. If rehabilitative employees who wanted to protect their
NLRA rights refused to attend any rehabilitation services, the
employer could also discharge them for good cause, either for
insubordination or because the employees’ actions demonstrate that
they no longer need a rehabilitative employment position. On the
other hand, if the discharge were animated by union animus, the
employees could pursue charges with the Board.
CONCLUSION
Rehabilitative employees are a special class of employees. The
Board must be sensitive in determining how and when to grant
NLRA rights to them. Although the federal government favors the
employment of individuals with disabilities in rehabilitative
settings, a blanket denial of NLRA rights to this class is dangerous
because it enables employers to exploit workers. On the other hand,
giving rehabilitative employees sweeping NLRA coverage is unwise
because there are risks of overconsumption of resources and reduced
willingness to create rehabilitation programs. The solution this Note
provides navigates between these concerns by providing NLRA
rights to employees with disabilities unless their employer is
actively providing rehabilitation services or unless the employees
are newly hired. 
employee in order to weaken union support); Steere Broad. Corp., 158 N.L.R.B. 487, 496
(1966) (finding NLRA violation for attempting to promote employee to supervisory position
in order to remove him from a bargaining unit).
231. Steere Broad., 158 N.L.R.B. at 496.
232. Cf. id.
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In granting limited NLRA protections to rehabilitative employees,
it is important to remember what the rehabilitative employees are
receiving. NLRA rights are not a golden ticket. Rehabilitative em-
ployees simply would have all the same rights, with all the same
problems, that normal employees have, such as difficulty in
achieving a first collective bargaining agreement.233 They would
probably face stiff employer resistance, as do most other organizing
groups of employees.234 Under the employment-at-will doctrine,
employers would retain the right to hire or fire anyone for any
reason or no reason at all, so long as they did not discriminate on
the basis of protected status or activity, like age, sex, religion, or
section 7 rights.235 Section 7 rights are critical, however, in order for
rehabilitative employees to protect themselves from long-term
exploitation. The modified “typically industrial, primarily rehabilita-
tive”236 test makes it more likely that rehabilitative employees will
have section 7 rights.
The Board presently has an excellent opportunity to adopt this
proposed solution. The Board disfavors rulemaking and prefers
adopting decision-making rubrics through adjudication.237 The
Supreme Court has recognized the Board’s authority to adopt
forward-looking standards through the adjudication process.238 As
this Note shows, when there is a Democratic majority on the Board,
the Board recognizes NLRA rights for rehabilitative employees.239
After three years of vacancies, the Board is now fully staffed and
233. Only 56 percent of Board-recognized bargaining units achieve their first collective
bargaining agreement. JOHN-PAUL FERGUSON & THOMAS A. KOCHAN, SEQUENTIAL FAILURES
IN WORKERS’ RIGHT TO ORGANIZE 1 (2008), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/
dmdocuments/sequential_failures_in_workers_right_to_organize_3_25_2008.pdf.
234. See Lighthouse for the Blind of Houston, 248 N.L.R.B. 1366, 1369 (1980) (holding that
the employer violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) by refusing to recognize a union as the
representative of blind employees, refusing to bargain, and refusing to provide information),
enforced, 696 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1983). 
235. Charles J. Muhl, The Employment-at-Will Doctrine, 124 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 3 & n.3
(2001).
236. Brevard Achievement Ctr., Inc., 342 N.L.R.B. 982, 993 (2004) (Members Liebman and
Walsh, dissenting).
237. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
238. NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) (“[T]he Board is not precluded
from announcing new principles in an adjudicative proceeding.”).
239. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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has a Democratic majority.240 Moreover, current Chairwoman Wilma
B. Liebman wrote a biting dissent against the denial of NLRA rights
to rehabilitative employees in Brevard.241 The current Board thus
has the authority and predisposition to adopt the modified standard.
This Note’s test is a reasonable method for extending NLRA rights
to rehabilitative employees, and it does so in a manner that is less
capricious than the current test and more responsive to the policy
considerations on both sides of the coverage issue. The Board should
adopt the proposed test, because there are simply certain cases in
which rehabilitative employees should not be left out in the cold.
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